Status vocabulary matches doc/FEATURES.md:
Done (tested), Partial, Fail-closed,
Not started.
UDP#
Versioned datagram envelope: version || hdrLen || header || nonce || ct||tag.
AES-256-GCM with AAD-bound sequence. Replay peeks the sequence before
AEAD open. Send path uses swissarmyknife Throttler. Encrypted session
is X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768, or SecP384r1MLKEM1024 with
identical HKDF extra on both roles.
The handshake is a QUIC Initial long header. The client datagram is
padded to 1200 bytes, and the server discards anything shorter. The
server answers with its own Initial. A peer opens the client packet
with the client initial keys and the server packet with the server
initial keys, both from the client's destination connection ID.
Application data is a QUIC short header. A dropped frame is sent
again under a new packet number. Not ECN. Not curl --http3.
The call is PqEncryptedUdpSocket.initiate, then accept, then
completeInitiate, then send. Both endpoints and the KEM key are
in the Cookbook.
TLS 1.3#
Client and server StateMachines from swissarmyknife. Illegal event →
failed + Result.failure. RFC 8446-shaped ClientHello / ServerHello
(OPEN-01). EncryptedExtensions + Certificate + CertificateVerify +
Finished. RFC 7250 RawPublicKey is the default. Opt-in X.509 is a
caller-supplied chain of 1 to 8, leaf first, checked by pqforge. Trust
is caller anchors or one self-signed SPKI pin. No AIA, no system trust
store, no browser. AES-256-GCM (0x1302) or ChaCha20-Poly1305
(0x1303) records; handshake vs application epochs reset sequence.
TLS exporter is deterministic on a fixture. Schedule follows the suite:
HKDF-SHA-384 for IANA 0x1302 (default), HKDF-SHA-256 for IANA
0x1303. Private-use 0xFF00 is retired.
HelloRetryRequest is on the wire with cookie extension 44 and
selected_group (OPEN-05). Once-only; a second HRR fails closed.
BoringSSL's HRR carries no cookie; that decodes. OpenSSL 3.5.9 completes
the three RFC 10024 groups (raw-pk and X.509, both directions) and
X25519, secp256r1, secp384r1, and MLKEM1024. BoringSSL 0.20261020.0 is
a TLS peer on X25519MLKEM768 and those four fallback groups, not on
SecP256r1MLKEM768 or SecP384r1MLKEM1024. curl linked to this OpenSSL
does HTTP/1.1 GETs with --cacert, including a reused connection and
Connection: close against PqHttpServer. Not curl --http3.
ECH (RFC 9849) is self-interop and one BoringSSL flight. The suite is
DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256), HKDF-SHA256, AES-128-GCM, via PqHpke
(pqforge 0.4.10). Inner name localhost, public name public.example.
A client with an EchConfig does not send a cleartext second hello.
Not an OpenSSL flight. Not GREASE. Not DNS. Not a browser.
The call is PqTlsSocket.client and PqTlsSocket.server, then
handshake, send, and exporter. SNI, ALPN, and
peerAuthenticated are in the Cookbook. The
program is example/tls13.dart.
DNS / DoH / DoT#
Wire codec for A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, TXT, SRV, CAA, HTTPS, SVCB, OPT, PTR,
NS, DNSKEY, DS, and RRSIG. Compression pointer cycles are rejected. Rdata name pointers
(CNAME / NS / PTR / MX / SRV / HTTPS / SVCB) resolve against the outer
message (OPEN-08). TTL cache uses an injected
clock. CircuitBreaker wraps exchange and opens after
failureThreshold. Resolver failover is DoH, then DoT, then UDP.
DNSSEC verifies algorithms 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 16 via pqforge, from a
caller-supplied trust anchor down the zone cuts. RSA is PKCS#1 with
moduli of 1024, 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. A trust anchor may be a DS
set. Algorithm 16 is Ed448, pure, empty context. The stub sets RD,
DO, and CD, requires a matching response id, retries a truncated UDP
answer over TCP, and retries BADCOOKIE once. example/dns_validate.dart
signs a zone in memory. example/dns_live.dart validates
yardenah.com from the IANA root DS set. SOA and unknown RRs decode.
NSEC and NSEC3 prove a missing name and a missing type, and a cached
proof answers a later name in that span. NSEC3 is hash algorithm 1,
SHA-1 from pqforge 0.4.11. The iteration field is 0 through 65535.
The iterative resolver's ceiling defaults to 0. That resolver follows
referrals from root hints and returns secure, insecure, or bogus.
The AD bit is not validation. Not an authoritative server.
PqDnsClient.lookup is one query. resolve follows CNAME.
authenticateDns takes lookup, not resolve. DoH is
DohClient.h2 or DohClient.h3, then PqDnsResolver(doh: exchange).
DoT is DotClient after ALPN dot, with encodeDnsTcp. The
iterative walker is DnsIterativeResolver. Each of those calls is
in the Cookbook. The programs are
example/dns_stub.dart, example/dns_validate.dart,
example/dns_live.dart, example/doh.dart, and example/dot.dart.
mDNS#
Probe / announce / browse on 5353. Receivers join 224.0.0.251 /
ff02::fb (joinMdnsGroups). Optional ML-DSA-65 TXT (pqsig=).
An optional second field, pqslh=, is SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f and is not
the default. EventBus announcements per client. Real LAN mDNS uses
IoDatagramChannel.joinMulticast. Browsers have no raw UDP (LIM-04).
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f is archival only. The other eleven sets are not
used here, and TLS CertificateVerify stays ML-DSA.
The call is beginProbe, two completeProbes, then announce.
signTxt takes crypto, secretKey, name, and
body.
signTxtArchival is the optional SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f path. Both are
in the Cookbook. The program is
example/mdns_discovery.dart.
QUIC / HTTP#
1-RTT short-header HP and Initial long-header HP. Handshake packets
use the TLS handshake traffic secrets. ClientHello and ServerHello stay
in Initial. Transport parameters ride in ClientHello and
EncryptedExtensions. CRYPTO frames carry a live TLS handshake (RFC 9001,
no TLS records). OpenSSL 3.5.9 s_client -quic completes a QUICv1
handshake and verifies an ML-DSA-65 localhost certificate.
PqQuicConn.client completes against OpenSSL demos/quic/server
(Retry, ALPN ossltest, that certificate checked). quiche 0.30.0
(fa0e480), linked to BoringSSL 0.20261020.0, completes one HTTP/3
GET both ways: the quiche client checks the ML-DSA-65 certificate
and reads body pq-h3; the Dart client reads body quiche-h3.
QPACK capacity stays 0 because that quiche build rejects dynamic
references. It is not curl --http3 and not a complete RFC 9114
stack. The gap list is TODO.md.
HTTP/1.1 decodes chunked bodies and trailers, writes the registered
reason phrase, and rejects obs-fold plus Content-Length conflicts.
A missing, empty, or duplicate Host on HTTP/1.1 fails. curl linked
to OpenSSL 3.5.9 --http1.1 reads chunked pq-h1 from
PqHttpServer, reuses one connection for a second response, and
opens a new connection after Connection: close. OpenSSL
s_server -max_send_frag 512 serves a 2048-octet body. Every TLS
record ciphertext on that flight is at most 529 octets, and
PqHttpClient reassembles the body. The same limit fragments
ServerHello; the client buffers it until the handshake message is
complete (RFC 8446 §5.1). A 32-byte in-memory split remains a unit
test. HTTP/2 enforces connection and
stream windows, the four SETTINGS limits, stream states, GOAWAY,
RST_STREAM, trailers, and CONTINUATION. Extended CONNECT and
PRIORITY_UPDATE on HTTP/3 are the quiche flights. HTTP/2
PRIORITY_UPDATE is still in-memory. curl 8.23.0 with nghttp2 1.66.0 completed
one HTTP/2 GET. libnghttp2 1.66.0 completed extended CONNECT.
curl wss:// did not. The server does not send
ENABLE_PUSH. The old PRIORITY frame is ignored. It is not a
complete RFC 9113 stack. HTTP/3 on PqQuicConn is the quiche GET
above, plus one control stream (SETTINGS, then GOAWAY, MAX_PUSH_ID,
and CANCEL_PUSH), QPACK limits, trailers, and request cancel.
SETTINGS_H3_DATAGRAM=1 is sent only when the peer advertised
max_datagram_frame_size. HTTP datagrams and PRIORITY_UPDATE are
the same quiche flights. connect-ip-go v0.6.0 parsed
ADDRESS_ASSIGN and ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT. masque-go v0.6.0
completed one CONNECT-UDP echo, and the reverse echoed
ping-reverse. connect-ip-go did the same in both directions,
including one 20-byte IPv4 packet to 198.51.100.1. Both
checked ML-DSA-65. The payloads are QUIC DATAGRAMs. The
UDP reverse response includes capsule-protocol: ?1. Unknown
control-stream frames are ignored. Push is off. It is not a
complete RFC 9114 stack and not curl --http3. Silent
h2/h3→h1 downgrade is refused (allowDowngrade: false).
HTTP/1.1 is PqHttpClient.roundTrip after the server listens on
applicationData. HTTP/2 is PqHttp2Session.server plus
roundTripH2. HTTP/3 is PqQuicConn plus roundTripH3. Shelf
replaces shelf_io.serve and SecurityContext with serveShelf.
Relic's web server takes PqRelicAdapter instead of IOAdapter.
Serverpod's API and insights servers still build a SecurityContext
inside Serverpod. Shelf, Relic, and that Serverpod limit are in
the Cookbook. The HTTP programs are
example/http1.dart, example/http2.dart, and example/http3.dart.