Allowed:
- FIPS 203-aligned ML-KEM, FIPS 204-aligned ML-DSA, and FIPS 205-aligned SLH-DSA, through pqcrypto. SLH-DSA is keygen, custody, and detached sign/verify. Envelopes and hybrid-sign stay ML-DSA.
- Application composition: KEM-DEM, AEAD sessions, hybrids, streaming, multi-recipient envelopes, wrapped keys, recipes, X.509, PKCS#10, RFC 9180 HPKE, and the CLI.
-
Opt-in signature legs in the same release:
slhDsa:on detached recipes,compose-sign(2 or 3 legs), and ECDSA-P384 / ECDSA-P521.hybrid-signstays one ML-DSA leg plus one classical leg. - Best-effort zeroization through
package:zeroize. - Brainpool ECDH (RFC 5639, the three TLS groups) and RFC 7919 FFDHE as agreement. The byte contract matches OpenSSL. Not a TLS stack.
Not allowed:
- FIPS validated, FIPS 140 validated, CMVP validated, certified.
- A hard constant-time Dart guarantee.
-
A hard memory-erasure guarantee.
disposeon an HPKE context scrubs the buffers it holds. Copies the runtime already made are outside that call. - "ML-KEM alone is secure transport." Transport is pqtransport.
- "AES signs documents." AES encrypts. ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, or RSA signs.
- RC4.
- HPKE as a FIPS module or as TLS.
- An OpenSSL HPKE claim for X25519, P-256, or P-384.
- A BoringSSL HPKE claim for X448, P-521, PSK, or HKDF-SHA512.
- A certificate as a WebPKI CA or a trust store.
-
ECDSA-P521 as a TLS group, or as the HPKE P-521 share.
PqEcdsaP521signs.PqNistEcdh.p521SharedSecretis still the HPKE share. compose-signas a FIPS module, or as a constant-time construction.-
SLH-DSA inside an envelope or inside
hybrid-sign. A composite leg is opt-in and stays outside those two. -
PqBrainpoolorPqFfdheas a TLS handshake, as constant-time, or as a NIST curve. There is no NIST P-512. brainpoolP512r1 is RFC 5639. - BoringSSL 0.20261020.0 as a check of ML-KEM-512 or of any SLH-DSA set other than SHA2-128s and SHAKE-256f. Those two, plus ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024, and ML-DSA-44/65/87, are what that pin exports. The other ten SLH-DSA sets are checked against OpenSSL 4.1.0.
BoringSSL 0.20261020.0 is a checked HPKE peer for base and auth, X25519 and P-256, HKDF-SHA256 and HKDF-SHA384, and the three AEADs.
OpenSSL 3.5.9 is a checked HPKE peer for all four modes, X448 and P-521, HKDF-SHA256 and HKDF-SHA512, and the three AEADs. P-384 HPKE stays a round trip. It is not in that OpenSSL sentence.
The repository copy of this boundary is
doc/security/CLAIM_BOUNDARY.md.