pqforge

Claim boundary

What pqforge is allowed to say about itself.

Allowed:

  • FIPS 203-aligned ML-KEM, FIPS 204-aligned ML-DSA, and FIPS 205-aligned SLH-DSA, through pqcrypto. SLH-DSA is keygen, custody, and detached sign/verify. Envelopes and hybrid-sign stay ML-DSA.
  • Application composition: KEM-DEM, AEAD sessions, hybrids, streaming, multi-recipient envelopes, wrapped keys, recipes, X.509, PKCS#10, RFC 9180 HPKE, and the CLI.
  • Opt-in signature legs in the same release: slhDsa: on detached recipes, compose-sign (2 or 3 legs), and ECDSA-P384 / ECDSA-P521. hybrid-sign stays one ML-DSA leg plus one classical leg.
  • Best-effort zeroization through package:zeroize.
  • Brainpool ECDH (RFC 5639, the three TLS groups) and RFC 7919 FFDHE as agreement. The byte contract matches OpenSSL. Not a TLS stack.

Not allowed:

  • FIPS validated, FIPS 140 validated, CMVP validated, certified.
  • A hard constant-time Dart guarantee.
  • A hard memory-erasure guarantee. dispose on an HPKE context scrubs the buffers it holds. Copies the runtime already made are outside that call.
  • "ML-KEM alone is secure transport." Transport is pqtransport.
  • "AES signs documents." AES encrypts. ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, or RSA signs.
  • RC4.
  • HPKE as a FIPS module or as TLS.
  • An OpenSSL HPKE claim for X25519, P-256, or P-384.
  • A BoringSSL HPKE claim for X448, P-521, PSK, or HKDF-SHA512.
  • A certificate as a WebPKI CA or a trust store.
  • ECDSA-P521 as a TLS group, or as the HPKE P-521 share. PqEcdsaP521 signs. PqNistEcdh.p521SharedSecret is still the HPKE share.
  • compose-sign as a FIPS module, or as a constant-time construction.
  • SLH-DSA inside an envelope or inside hybrid-sign. A composite leg is opt-in and stays outside those two.
  • PqBrainpool or PqFfdhe as a TLS handshake, as constant-time, or as a NIST curve. There is no NIST P-512. brainpoolP512r1 is RFC 5639.
  • BoringSSL 0.20261020.0 as a check of ML-KEM-512 or of any SLH-DSA set other than SHA2-128s and SHAKE-256f. Those two, plus ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024, and ML-DSA-44/65/87, are what that pin exports. The other ten SLH-DSA sets are checked against OpenSSL 4.1.0.

BoringSSL 0.20261020.0 is a checked HPKE peer for base and auth, X25519 and P-256, HKDF-SHA256 and HKDF-SHA384, and the three AEADs.

OpenSSL 3.5.9 is a checked HPKE peer for all four modes, X448 and P-521, HKDF-SHA256 and HKDF-SHA512, and the three AEADs. P-384 HPKE stays a round trip. It is not in that OpenSSL sentence.

The repository copy of this boundary is doc/security/CLAIM_BOUNDARY.md.