This page is the 0.4.10 signature rollout. It does not replace HPKE, Certificates, Symmetric, or Classical. Those pages stay the source for encapsulation, X.509, AEAD, and ECDH.
What was already there#
-
Detached ML-DSA, including recipe
signfor a document, text, media, or artifact. -
hybrid-sign: one ML-DSA leg plus one classical leg. That classical leg was Ed25519 or ECDSA-P256. - Standalone
ecdsa-signfor ECDSA-P256 (RFC 6979, low-S). - SLH-DSA on
keygenand on detachedsign/verify. -
Envelope signatures and
.pqfsheader signatures stay ML-DSA.hybrid-signdoes not take an SLH-DSA key.
What this release adds#
Detached recipes now take slhDsa: as well as ML-DSA. That includes
documents, text, media, webhooks, artifacts, issueToken,
appendSignedLogEntry, and createIdentityBinding. Pass one of the two,
not both. An ML-DSA token from 0.4.9 still verifies. Token JSON stays
version 1. CLI sign --kind webhook needs --event-type. The CLI does
not enforce a replay window.
compose-sign is 2 legs (dual) or 3 (triple). Each flag is one algorithm.
Nothing is implied.
| Flag | Leg |
|---|---|
--ml-dsa-secret | the ML-DSA set in that key |
--slh-secret | the SLH-DSA set in that key |
--classical-secret |
Ed25519, ECDSA-P256, ECDSA-P384, or ECDSA-P521. Repeatable |
--policy require-all is the default. --policy accept-any succeeds when
one leg verifies.
keygen --classical ecdsa-p384 and --classical ecdsa-p521 emit those
keys. They are not in the default classical set. That default is still
X25519, Ed25519, and ECDSA-P256. ecdsa-sign follows the key.
hybrid-sign is still exactly one ML-DSA leg plus one classical leg, and
that classical leg may now be P-384 or P-521.
PqEcdsaP521 signs. It is not PqNistEcdh.p521SharedSecret. The P-521
ECDH share is still the HPKE KEM share, and it is still not a TLS group.
P-384 and P-521 ECDSA are not methods on PqClassicalProvider.
None of this is constant-time. None of it changes .pqf or .pqfs.